The recent clashes in the Kursk oblast involving Ukrainian forces are sowing confusion and giving rise to numerous hypotheses.
More than twenty-four hours after the outbreak of fighting in the Kursk oblast, Ukrainian media such asUgrainska Pravda merely relayed statements by “Russian propagandists and so-called ‘war correspondents'” that “Ukrainian armed forces have entered the territory of the Kursk oblast”. On the Ukrainian side, no official comment has been made on these events. The Hromadske TV channel recalls that, as early as July 31, “Ukrainian forces struck material depots near Kursk” and asks: “Has the Ukrainian army really entered the Kursk region?”
Although raids from Ukraine have previously targeted the Russian oblasts of Kursk and Belgorod, what surprises the Kiev media is that these incursions were previously carried out by Russian groups supervised by the Ukrainian army, such as the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom Legion of Russia, who broadcast videos of their actions, often with no aftermath. Fokous magazine points out that RDK operations were primarily aimed at “influencing Russian public opinion” by creating “media noise”. Yet, adds Fokous, “the RDK and the Freedom Legion of Russia have made no statement on the fighting in the Kursk oblast”. As for the Ukrainian General Staff, it is maintaining a “complete silence” on what some Russian bloggers are calling a “breakthrough”, notes Fokous, ironically referring to the start of “the ‘liberation’ of Kursk Oblast”.
Putin concerned
In Russia, the authorities were slow to grasp the seriousness of the situation. On August 7, at a meeting with his government, Vladimir Putin appeared visibly concerned by the events in Kursk, describing them as a “large-scale Ukrainian provocation”. The Russian president announced that he had urgently summoned the heads of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff and the FSB, the internal security services responsible for border protection. The previous day, independent Russian media had reported that the Defense Ministry had described the attack as an “attempted incursion”, before withdrawing this assertion from its statement, according to the BBC’s Russian-language service on Telegram.
While the official Russian media largely ignored the attack, it was widely commented on by the voenkor community, pro-war Russian military experts and correspondents, who once again criticized the army ministry and command for failing to anticipate the attack. Instead, the voenkor refer to a large-scale military operation, apparently planned long in advance, with the aim of permanently taking control of part of Russian territory, including the Kurchatov nuclear power plant, located some 60 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Aleksandr Sladkov, a public television correspondent, put forward this hypothesis on Telegram, where he is followed by over 900,000 subscribers.
Some, like military expert Yuri Kotenok, even speak of a “surprise counter-offensive” by the Ukrainian army, aimed at strengthening Kiev’s positions with a view to future peace negotiations, which could include territory swaps. Ukrainian analysts wonder why such an operation would have been launched when the situation remains tense on the Donbass front, particularly near Pokrovsk. According to Mykola Melnyk, a Ukrainian officer, this incursion, carried out by the Ukrainian 22nd mechanized brigade according to some Russian sources, could be aimed at “forcing the Russians to maintain reserves in their western regions”, instead of sending them to the Pokrovsk and Toretsk front, thus reducing the pressure on Ukrainian forces.
However, Melnyk warns that “action that is too limited and not powerful enough will have no effect, even in the short term”. For his part, Viktor Androussiv, former adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, raises other hypotheses concerning Fokous: it could be a question of diverting the reserves of the Northern Group from the Russian forces, who are attacking in the Kharkiv region, or of a pre-emptive strike to forestall a planned Russian offensive towards Soumy. Finally, Androussiv does not rule out the possibility of Ukrainian forces attempting to seize the Kourtchatov nuclear power plant, which would enable them to negotiate an exchange with the Zaporijjia plant. However, he tempers this hypothesis by pointing out that “this version would have very little chance of success”.
